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Abstract 
 During the Second World War, the Indian Army held back units and soldiers that were 
not from the so-called “martial races” from frontline combat service. The British “martial races” 
theory held that only a small number of communities in India were fit for military service and 
people from all “non-martial” communities should be excluded from the Army. Has the Indian 
Army, after gaining independence from British leadership, contended the Second World War 
practice of deploying “martial” units in combat while assigning “non-martial” units to non-
combat roles? It has been conclusively demonstrated that “martial race” groups have contended 
to be overrepresented in the post-colonial Indian Army. However, there has been little study into 
how the “martial races” theory has continued to affect the Indian Army outside the matter of the 
recruitment of soldiers. The Indian Army, while being forced by political leadership to open up 
recruitment to “non-martial” communities, contended the Second World War practice of tending 
to select units composed of “martial” soldier to see action while tending to held back units 
composed of “non-martial” soldiers. Using a new data set I build, this study measures the effect 
of martial identity on the likelihood an infantry company in the Indian Army will be deployed 
into combat during a war. During each war sampled, the Kashmir War 1947-8, the Sino-Indian 
War 1962, the India-Pakistan War 1965, and the India-Pakistan War 1971, “martial” infantry 
companies were more likely to see combat action then “non-martial” units. However, this effect 
is heterogeneous across the wars, with greater effect seen in the Sino-Indian War 1962 and India-
Pakistan War 1971. This thesis contributes to the literature by advancing a new theoretical 
understanding of the political consequences of social representation in combat fatalities. Groups 
that fight for the country can demonstrate a “blood sacrifice” for the nation. A group’s political 
leadership can use the memory of that “blood sacrifice” to make demands from the political 
system. However, there are barriers to a group’s ability to make demands from the political 
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Introduction 
In 1857, a near revolution would rock British India. Indian soldiers of the 11th and 20th 
Bengal Native Infantry regiments and 3rd Light Cavalry mutinied and took control of Delhi.1 The 
rebels proclaimed from the city that the Bahadur Shah Zafar, the Mughal emperor, to be the 
leader of the revolt.2 The uprising spread out of Delhi through all of the northern Gangetic plain 
of India and into central India and included armed uprisings of civilians as well as soldiers.3 It 
took the British 18 months to put down the rebellion.4 By the end of the rebellion, 6,000 of the 
40,000 European in India were killed and approximately 800,000 Indians died either from 
combat or the resulting famines and epidemics in the wake of the uprising.5 The uprising 
transformed British rule in South Asia. Control of India was taken over by the British Crown, 
marking the end of the British East Indian Company’s century long sovereignty. It also prompted 
a major reorganization of the British Indian Army.  
The Army leadership decided to shift recruitment away from upper-caste communities in 
Bengal and the Gangetic plain toward Punjab and northern India. The British emphasized that 
they were rebuilding the army to increase its capacity and to do so they recruited from “martial 
races” –those conceived as having members who exuded bravery and military aptitude. Field 
Marshal Frederick Roberts expressed his view about how the British needed to respond to the 
uprising, “We must recognize the necessity for only employ on service, across the North-West 
frontier, troops of the hardest and most warlike races…”6 But this social engineering was as 
                                                          





5 Douglas M. Peers, India Under Colonial Rule: 1700-1885 (New York: Routledge, 2013): 64. 
6 Heather Streets, The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture 1857-1914 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2004): 87. 
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much about revolution-proofing. Deeply scarred by the 1857 uprising, the British sought to build 
a loyal army and took signals on loyalty based on the social background of mutineers during the 
uprising. The British labelled groups were loyal during the uprising and lived closed to the 
Afghan-Russian frontier as the ‘martial races’.7 The British were concerned that Russian forces 
would invade India through Afghanistan. It was more cost effective to recruit soldiers to guard 
the border from areas near the Afghan border than further east or south in India because of 
shorter lines of communication. Groups that provided stiff resistance against British colonization 
where likely excluded from the ‘martial races’.8 British officials believed that people that live in 
the cooler hills of northern India were healthier than those that lived in the plains.9  
This reorganization of the Indian military would prove a critical juncture. Wilkinson 
shows that, while subsequently the post-colonial Indian Army recruits from all parts of India, 
traditional ‘martial races’ groups are still overrepresented in the uniformed personnel.10 I argue 
that it also shaped military deployment for the next 125 years. Companies from the “martial 
races” were more likely to be deployed on the frontline during the post-independence wars.  
Despite an official post-Independence policy of recruitment open 
to all, many ‘die-hard’ senior officers remained believers in the 
‘tribal’ izzat of the martial races and the Indian Army continued to 
enlist men from the north and northwest in numbers 
disproportionate to their respective communities’ share of the 
                                                          
7 Rand and Wagner, “Recruiting the ‘martial races’,” 237-238. 
Barua, “Inventing Race.”, 111. 
Gautam, Composition And Regimental System Of The Indian Army, 7. 
8 Ray, “The Nonmartial Origins of the “Martial Races” Ethnicity and Military Service in Ex-British Colonies,” 572. 
9 Barua, “Recruiting the ‘martial races’,” 108. 
10 Wilkinson, Army And Nation, 166. 
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national population. The immediate post-Independence conflict in 
[Jammu and Kashmir] followed by years of Indo-Pakistani and 
Sino-Indian tension further inhibited successive administrations 
from enforcing ‘radical changes in the organizations of the fighting 
arms’. Thus, while most ‘tail’ units and all post-independence 
raising such as the Parachute Regiment have been constituted on 
an all-India bases, the majority of the army’s ‘teeth’ arms remain 
the preserve of the martial races.11 
This pattern is due to Indian Army officers internalizing the British colonial mythology of the 
“martial races” and their importance to the effectiveness of India’s military readiness. This is 
best articulated by Field Marshal Sam Hormusji Framji Jamshedji Manekshaw, the Indian Chief 
of the Army Staff during the 1971 India-Pakistan war, who wrote in the forward of a study of the 
1965 India-Pakistan War: 
…I have heard rumours for the proposed re-organization of the 
Indian Army into mixed units on the basis of State population, 
under the garb of recruitment imbalances. Should this happen, God 
forbid, it would transform the battlefield scene completely…If this 
imprudent proposed political decision is accepted by sycophantic 
generals, I forecast doom and calamity…In the name of God, 
desist from such folly. Neither God nor future generations will 
forgive the perpetrators of such misplaced nationalism which will 
                                                          
11 Apurba Kundu, Militarism In India: The Army and Civil society in Consensus (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 
1998): 169-171. 
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lead to the destabilization of the famous Indian Army. May 
perdition fall on the heads of perpetrators of such a crime—A 
CRIME it will be – A CRIME to the traditions of these famous 
Regiments, a CRIME to the nation.12  
Field Marshal Manekshaw’s attitude towards the idea of changing the composition of the Indian 
Army shows that Indian officers during the first few decades after Independence had internalized 
the need for continuing to give the “martial races” special treatment. It could be that Indian 
officers think that the “martial races” are better soldiers than “non-martial” groups in India; or 
that Indian officers believe that remaking the Indian Army would be disruptive and would 
dangerously weaken the force. Either way, an informal survey conducted by the Indian think 
tank The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in 2010 showed that 22 of the 38 active or 
retired Indian Army officers interviewed expressed the belief that the Indian Army should not 
work to change the compositional imbalance in the Indian Army.13 
To test this argument, I have collected the combat records of each infantry company in 
the Indian Army. The Indian Army is made up of regiments. Each regiment is responsible for 
recruiting and training its own non-officer personnel. Each regiment has its own history, dress 
uniform, and esprit de corps. Each regiment is composed of a number of battalions, ranging 
between two and over twenty. Battalions are composed of companies, usually four companies in 
a battalion. Companies are either ‘All-India’ companies or are composed of specific groups. 
Some battalions are composed of specific ‘martial races’ group. Some battalions are composed 
of specific non-‘martial races’ group. Equipped with this information and matching it with a 
                                                          
12 Gautam, Composition And Regimental System Of The Indian Army, 58-59. 
13 Ibid, 63. 
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company’s service record, I am able to measure if some groups in Indian society have seen more 
combat deployments since independence than others.  
I find that infantry companies that were composed of “martial” groups saw higher levels 
of combat deployments and were more likely to see a combat deployment between 1947 and 
1971 than companies that did not have a “martial” composition. In other word, the reorganization 
of the Indian Army after 1857 would shape the deployment of Indian Army units for more than a 
century later. I also find interesting inter-war heterogeneity. It is most noticeable in the Sino-
Indian 1962 War and the India-Pakistan War 1971. Martialness does not seem to be an important 
factor in the unit deployments in the Kashmir War 1947-8 and the India-Pakistan War 1965. This 
pattern may be because of different geographic directions of the fronts. The Kashmir War 1947-8 
and the India-Pakistan War 1965 were both fought on only the north and western borders of 
India, while the Sino-Indian War 1962 and the India-Pakistan War 1971 had significant theaters 
of action along the eastern borders of India.   
This is the first thesis to test the impact of martialness on “blood sacrifice” in post-
independence. To date, no one has tested this because we lack compiled data on the service 
records of Army companies in post-Independence India. By carefully coding the sources listed in 
Appendix D, I built from scratch a data set of the combat history of every infantry company, 
approximately 1,800 companies, in the Indian Army between 1947 and 1971. Every infantry 
company was coded for being composed of either “martial” groups or “non-marital” groups. 
Then, every infantry company was coded for either seeing combat or not seeing combat during 
the Kashmir War 1947-48, the Sino-Indian War 1962, the 1965 India-Pakistan War, and the 
1971 India-Pakistan War.  
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The continuation of a martial informed pattern of unit deployment in the Indian Army 
after Independence brings in the question the effect of regime change on state institutions run by 
the government. This thesis demonstrates that the change in the political leadership of India from 
British appointed Viceroys to elected Indian politicians and the change in Indian Army 
leadership from British officers to Indian officers did not lead to the total cession of British 
policies and practices in the Indian Army. The wider implication here is that regime change is 
overrated. Changes in the political leadership of a government and the military leadership of an 
army do not in fact guarantee changes in policy. Resilient institutional memory and continued 
cultural norms preserve the ghost of the previous regime. Further study should be undertaken to 
see if this continuity in military policy is seen across other countries that has witnessed regime 
changes. The organization, practice, and traditions of national military are places to study regime 
change resilience as militaries have strong internal identities and senses of history, tend to be 
large powerful political actors, and oftentimes are not replaced by a regime change.14 Was the 
slice of French society that fought, and froze, and died in Russia in 1812 the same or different 
slice of French society that fought, and baked, and died in Mali in 2012? How was the Imperial 
German Army that marched to war in 1914 similar to the Bundeswehr deployed in Afghanistan 
in 2014? How has the composition of the Red Army in 1917 effected composition of the Russian 
“volunteers” in eastern Ukraine in 2017? This thesis casts doubt on the ability of political actors 
to change the institutions they inherit from the previous regime, questioning the value of 
revolution itself.  
                                                          
14 The exception to the last point is regime change by civil war where the old military is destroyed and replaced by 
the rebel military, like during the Russian Revolution/Civil War 1917-1923 and the China Revolutions 1911-1949, 
or in cases where a regime change involves bring in former rebel forces into the national military like the merger of 
the South African Defense Force, the national  military of the Apartheid government of South Africa, and uMkhonto 
we Sizwe, the armed wing of the African National Congress, into the South African National Defense Force in 1994.   
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Service in a national military is important because it allows members of a group to 
demonstrate their loyalty to the government and the country. The opportunity to demonstrate 
loyalty is particularly important for groups that are marginalized in society. If members of a 
group fight and die, make a blood sacrifice for the country, they can make a case to the political 
process that they deserve to have their grievances rectified. However, if a government or military 
leadership can control who serves in the military, political and military leaders can control which 
groups are able to make blood sacrifice claims to the political process. If marginalized groups are 
excluded from military service they do not get the material benefits often associated with 
military service of a reliable paycheck, medical and educational services, housing allowances, 
retirement schemes, and widow’s pensions. If marginalized groups are excluded from combat 
deployments by the military leadership, then the political leaders of that group cannot use 
memory of their sacrifices as a political tool demonstrating their rights as citizens of the country. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: This thesis begins with a summary of the 
factors other scholars have identified as important to determining which individuals are more 
likely to die in combat operations in modern militaries.  Next, is a brief history of the Indian 
Army during the British colonial rule. Then is a review of various theories that seek to explain 
the creation of the “martial races” in India. Next is a section that demonstrates the continued 
relevance of the “martial races” in post-colonial Indian military thinking. Then, this study’s data 
collection and methods are discussed followed by the findings of the study indicating that 
infantry units composed by the “martial races” were more likely in some cases to see combat 
then units composed of “non-martial races” between 1947 and 1971. Finally, the thesis is 
concluded with a section looking at the role of military service in citizenship formation and how 
the memory of combat deaths can be used in domestic politics. 
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Who Usually Does the Dying: Theories of Combat Deployment 
 This section reviews existing scholarship on combat service in the modern age.15 A 
number of factors may make some segments of the population more likely to join the military 
and more likely to serve on the frontlines. Social factors, like class and race and ethnicity, 
individual factors, like family background, education, and biochemical composition, and the 
institutional role of the draft all affect the likelihood of someone joining the military and ending 
up in combat. One prevailing hypothesis is that social class structures select who serves. People 
from lower socio-economic background have less access to the social capital that would allow 
them to avoid military service and combat deployments.16 But there is some evidence that the 
class effect is not significant in all cases.17 Another important factor in determining the 
likelihood that someone will die in a combat role in the military is their ethnic or racial identity.18 
                                                          
15 This study is only going to look at people who die servicing in a military organization. Wars often include the 
deaths of civilians ether directly in combat or because the conflict products conditions that are suitable to like, like 
famine and disease. While many have claimed that in the 20th Century 90 percent of causalities from war are 
civilians, that ratio has been challenged recently.  
Adam Roberts, “Lives and Statistics: Are 90% of War Victims Civilians?” Survival 52, no. 3 (2010): 115-136. 
16 Bertam S. Allen Jr., Douglas Herrmann, Steven L. Giles, “Vietnam as a class war: myth or reality?” Sociological 
Spectrum 14 (1994): 299-311. 
Albert J. Mayer and Thomas Ford Hoult, “Social stratification and combat survival” Social Forces 34 (1955): 155-
159. 
Meredith A Kleykamp, “College, jobs, or the military? Enlistment during a time of war” Social Science Quarterly 
87, no. 2 (2006): 272-290.  
17 Arnold Barnett, Timothy Stanly, Michael Shore, “America’s Vietnam casualties—victims of a class war?” 
Operational Research 40, no. 5 (1992): 856-866. 
Thomas C. Wilson, “Vietnam-Era Military Service- a Test of the Class-Bias Thesis” Armed Forces and Society 21, 
no. 3 (1995): 461-471. 
Unfortunately, much of the research into the effect of social class on combat deployment is focused on U.S. forces 
in the Vietnam War which over emphases one case.  
18 Joshua D. Angrist, “The draft lottery and voluntary enlistment in the Vietnam era” Journal of the American 
Statistical Association 86, no. 415 (1991): 584-595. 
Cynthia Gimbel and Alan Booth, “Who fought in Vietnam?” Social Forces 74 (1996): 1137-1157. 
Albert J. Mayer and Thomas Ford Hoult, “Social stratification and combat survival” Social Forces 34 (1955): 155-
159. 
Jay D. Teachman, Vaugh R.A. Call, Mady Wechsler Segal, “Family, Work, and School Influences on the Decision 
to Enter the Military” Journal of Family Issues 14, no. 2 (1993): 291-313. 
Robert D. Mare, Christopher Winship. “The paradox of lessening racial inequality and joblessness among black 
youth: enrollment, enlistment, and employment, 1964-1981” American Sociological Review 49, no. 1 (1984), 39-55. 
John T. Warner and Beth J. Asch, “The record and prospects of the all-volunteer military in the United States.” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 15, no. 2 (2001): 169-192. 
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People from marginalized racial or ethnic groups may have less access to the wealth and power 
needed to protect themselves from being drafted or be more likely to join the military for 
economic reasons. They may be more vulnerable to be forced into military service. However, 
governments may not want to provide people from marginalized groups with weapons and 
military training and would choose to exclude these groups from the military. Much like social 
class, there is evidence to suggest that race and the ethnic identity is not a significantly 
determining factor in all classes.19 
Individual factors may also shape the likelihood one sees combat and serves on the 
frontlines. For example, there is evidence to suggest that individuals who grow up in an area with 
a greater military presence and closer proximity to a military base are more likely to join the 
military.20 Similarly, social ties may influence enlistment. Individuals with family and 
community connections to the military are more likely to join the military.21 Education and 
cognitive abilities also seem to matter. Young people and those with low cognitive capabilities 
(e.g. as measured by lower IQs) are more likely to be assigned combat roles.22 Young people 
may be perceived as immature and not capable of handling more complex jobs in the military. 
Individuals with low cognitive capabilities are screened out of more complex non-combat 
assignment (such as military lawyers, surgeons, intelligence analysts, and aircraft mechanics) 
and assigned to infantry service. Similarly, in some cases, higher education reduces the 
likelihood of an individual joining the military as they are more likely to find civilian 
                                                          
19 Kleykamp, “College, jobs, or the military? Enlistment during a time of war”. 
Tim Kane, “Who Are the Recruits? The Demographic Characteristics of U.S. Military Enlistment, 2003-2005” The 
Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC (2006). 
Brian Gifford, “Combat casualties and race. What we can learn from the 2003-2004 Iraq conflict?” Armed Forces 
and Society 31, no. 2 (2005): 201-225. 
20 Kleykamp, “College, jobs, or the military? Enlistment during a time of war”. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Gimbel and Booth, “Who fought in Vietnam?”. 
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employment.23 Additionally, individuals with higher levels of testosterone and/or lower levels of 
cortisol in their bodies were more likely to end up in combat arms of the military.24 Finally, 
individuals with a history of misbehaving and receiving punishment from authorities in school 
and during basic training in the military are more likely into be assigned to the combat arms of 
the military.25 
The final important variable in determining the likelihood that someone will serve in the 
military and die in combat is whether or not the country has a draft. Draftees are in many cases 
more likely to end up in combat roles than individuals who enlisted in the military.26 Militaries 
do not want to bear the costs of training someone to perform a difficult task, such as conducting 
maintenance on a jet fighter, if that individual is going to leave the military when their one or 
two year tour of duty ends. The higher turnover rate of the draftees makes it more costly to train 
them and thus militaries are more likely to assign draftees to roles, like the infantry, that require 
less training. Additionally, militaries want to encourage people to enlist in the military, not be 
drafted in. Individuals who enlist in the military are making a much longer commitment to the 
armed services as a career and lifestyle, not just an act of forced labor. Therefore, militaries 
encourage people to enlist in the military by implicitly promising individuals that enlist that they 
will not be assigned to more risky roles in the military. During the American War in Vietnam 
(1964-1973), men with riskier draft lottery numbers volunteered more for military service than 
                                                          
23 Teachman, Call, Segal, “Family, Work, and School Influences on the Decision to Enter the Military”. 
24 Gimbel and Booth, “Who fought in Vietnam?”. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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men with safer lottery numbers.27 During that war, draftees died at disproportionately higher 
rates when compared to individuals that enlisted in the military.28 
In contrast to these existing theories that emphasize the importance of social class, 
individual factors and traits (such as cognitive capabilities, social ties, heritable testosterone 
levels) and institutional factors (such as the draft), I emphasize the importance of colonial 
legacies and how they shape military recruitment and deployment. As I describe in the next 
section, there is a robust historical scholarship on this subject but most stop at explaining how 
colonial legacies shape recruitment but don’t explore its legacy for deployment. 
Another critical difference between “martial race” identity and the above identities and 
factors is that the “martial race theory” was created by the military to affect who enlists. In 
contrast, other social structures, such as race, social class, and ethnic divisions, were not created 
for the purpose of military recruitment. They may have important implications for patterns of 
enlistment but these structure were created by other forces and imposed on militaries. By looking 
at the role “martial races” play in the recruitment and deployment policies of the Indian Army, 
we can learn how militaries create social constructs and how in turn they shape military decision-
making.  
In exploring this striking phenomenon, I focus on the case of India and not Pakistan, even 
though the Pakistani Army has its own history of “martial races”, because in Pakistan martial 
identity covaries with ethnic identity (especially among Punjabis and therefore functions as a 
describer on an ethnic identity. In India the “martial races” is a cross-cutting cleavage—it cuts 
                                                          
27 Angrist, “The draft lottery and voluntary enlistment in the Vietnam era”. 
28 Richard P. Talbot and Jon T. Oplinger, “Social Stratification and Ethnic Mobilization: U.S. Military Deaths in 
Southeast Asia,” Race, Gender & Class 21, no. ½ (January 2014): 195-210. 
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across a number of different ethnic groups. In the next section, I describe the origins of the social 
construction but first give a brief history of the formation of the Indian Army. 
Historical Development of the Indian Army 
Brief History of the Indian Army: 1600-1971 
 The British colonial project began in India in 1600, when Queen Elizabeth granted a 
charter to the “Governor and Company of the Merchants of London trading into the East 
Indies”.29 The East India Company’s territorial claim in India were in three parts, or 
Presidencies: Bengal, Bombay, and Madras. Each Presidency was responsible for its own 
defense and had its own armed force.30 In 1615, King James I sent Sir Thomas Roe as an 
ambassador to meet with Emperor Jahangir in Agra where Roe received a legal document 
acknowledging the English presence in Surat, in the Bombay Presidency, and allowing English 
merchants the right to bear arms.31 In 1661, a royal charter allowed the East India Company to 
recruit local soldiers at Fort William in Calcutta, Bengal. Also during that year, 400 English 
soldiers were sent to Bombay to protect the city. Later, in 1668, these soldiers were organized 
into first European regiment in India, the Bombay Fusiliers.32 The following year, the East India 
Company started recruiting local soldiers at Fort Saint George in Madras.33  
 
 
                                                          
29 Pradeep P. Barua, The State at War in South Asia (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005): 67. 
30 Daniel Marston, The Indian Army and the End of the Raj (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014): 7. 
31 Barua, The State at War in South Asia, 67, 70. 
32 Ibid, 70. 
33 Ibid. 
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Fig. 1: Map of India in 170034 
 
 In the 1740s and 1750s, The British East India Company fought to remove other 
European countries from India. In 1748, after a conflict with France, the British East India 
Company undertook a major reform effort, including establishing a European regiment in 
                                                          
34 Gotha Justus Pertus and Charels Joppen, A Historical Atlas of Indian for use of High-Schools, Colleges, and 
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Madras and recruited an additional 2,000 local soldiers. As part of this reform process, the 
British adopted the French practice recruiting locals as sepoys and training them training them in 
the European line infantry tactics.35 In Surat, the Company raised an additional 2,000 soldiers, 
mostly Arabs and Turks. The Bengal Presidency raised five to seven companies. Each 
Presidency also raised an artillery company. In 1756, the Seven Years’ War broke out, pitting 
Britain against France again. The French defeat in India left Britain the sole European military 
power in India. After the end of the conflict, Gen. Robert Clive reorganized the Bengal Army.36 
Clive established a regiment of Bengal locals commanded by European officers. This policy, 
local soldiers with European officers, remained the rule in the Indian Army until after the First 
World War.37 By the end of 1761, the Bengal Army had 1,200 European soldiers and 8,500 local 
sepoy soldiers.38 The Madras Army had two European battalions, six sepoy battalions, and two 







                                                          
35 Sepoy is a widely used term to refer to Indian foot soldiers that severed in the armies of the British East India 
Company and the British Indian Army. 
36 Ibid, 70. 
37 Ibid, 71. 
38 Ibid, 70.  
39 Ibid. 
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Fig 2: Map of India in 176040 
  
In 1763, Clive’s reforms paid off when Mir Kasim, the nawab of Bengal, led a campaign 
against the British.41 At the end of the conflict, the British East India Company abolished the 
                                                          
40 Charles Colbeck, The Public Schools Historical Atlas (New York: Longman Green and Co., 1905). 
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position of nawab of Bengal and took direct control of the territory, which became a base from 
which British influence grew through northern India. During this conflict, British commanders 
deployed their forces so that European units were in the center of the line of battle with sepoy 
units on both flanks.42 British commanders learned to trust the battle worthiness of sepoy forces. 
Maj. Hector Munro declared in the House of Commons that, “Sepoys properly disciplined and 
led on with the Europeans are good soldiers and will do anything”.43 
In the 1760s, the recruitment practices of the three Presidencies began to diverge. Madras 
and Bombay tended to recruit local soldiers from geographic and communally diverse 
backgrounds.44 The army of the Bengal Presidency was different. The Bengal Presidency 
recruited soldiers almost exclusively from high-caste groups in the Awadh (or Oudh) region.45 At 
the same time, the Bengal army became the dominant force of the three Presidency’s armies. By 
1800, this recruit pattern was causing problems. High-caste soldiers would refuse to take orders 
from a comparably lower-caste non-commissioned officer, insisted on food being prepared to 
meet their religious taboos, and critically during 1838 war in Afghanistan refused to cross the 
Indus River and leave “Hindustan”.46 Therefore, after the First and Second Anglo-Sikh Wars of 
the 1840s, the Bengal army began recruiting from the Punjab region.47 Soldiers from the defeated 
Punjabi forces were recruited into the Punjab Irregular Force and the Punjab Frontier Force, with 
some recruitment allowed within the Bengal regiments stationed in Punjab.48 The Bengal army 
resisted the creation of Sikh and Punjabi regiments because the belief of some British officers 
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45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid, 7, 8. 
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that the Punjab needed to be demilitarized, dislike by sepoys of Punjabis, and professional 
jealousy.49  
Fig 3. Map of Indian in 190750 
 
 
Then in 1857, there was an uprising in the ranks of the Bengal army. During the 1857, 
uprising many of the communities, in particular upper-caste Brahmins, from Bengal and United 
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Province rose up against the British.51 Eastern India in the 1850s was no longer a center of 
conflict and the Bengal soldiers were living in geographic regions that were closers the physical 
center of power in Calcutta. Because of their lack of threats to deal with and their proximity to 
political power, the soldiers in the Bengal Army were more politically aware then other groups 
farther from Calcutta. Therefore, they organized and rose up while other groups that lived far 
away from Bengal did not.52  Other groups, mostly from northern India, stayed loyal to the 
British and helped put down the uprising. These loyal groups become classified as the “martial 
races”.53 Soldiers from Punjab, some 50,000 men, remained loyal to the British and were critical 
in putting down the uprising.54 In response to the uprising, the British crown and government 
took over the colonial project in India from the British East India Company. The British 
government began reorganizing the Bengal army. The army reduced the recruitment of 
Hindustani Brahmans and integrated the Punjabi irregular forces into the regular army.55  
In the 1870s, the British became increasingly concerned about the potential threat from 
Russia to their Indian holdings. During the 1860s and 1870s, Russia had taken control of much 
of central Asia and was now bordering Afghanistan. To respond to this new threat, the British 
shifted military operation to the northern and north-western parts of India. The 1879 Eden 
Commission recommended that the three separate Presidency armies be brought under a single 
Commander-in-Chief, further recruitment of troops from the Punjab region, and the scaling down 
                                                          
51 Gavin Rand and Kim A. Wagner, “Recruiting the ‘martial races’: identities and military service in colonial India.” 
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of the Madras Army.56 While some British officers resisted the change, Field Marshal Lord 
Roberts of Kandahar, appointed as Commander-in-Chief in 1885, quickly moved to put these 
plans in action. Roberts was firm believer in the need to recruit soldiers from northern India. It is 
under Roberts’s tenor of Commander-in-Chief that the “martial races” theory became the firm 
policy of British officers in India. Roberts stated that, “I have no hesitation myself in stating that 
except Gurkhas, Dogras, Sikhs, the pick of Punjabi Muhammadans [Muslims], Hindustanis of 
the Jat and Ranghur casts… [and] certain classes of Pathans [Pashtuns], there are no Native 
soldiers in our service whom we could venture with safety to place in the field against the 
Russians.”57 Many groups, such as Bengalis and groups from south India, were deemed ‘non-
martial’ and were excluded from service in the army. Additionally, the British did not want to 
recruit soldiers from urban areas because of the belief that educated, cosmopolitan, city-dwellers 
were more politically active than rural peasants and were too soft to be soldiers. By 1893, 44 
percent of the Indian Army were drawing recruits from the “martial races”.58 Regiments that 
were organically recruiting from the “non-martial” communities were increasingly shifting their 
recruitment efforts to the recruited from “martial” communities in Punjab, the North-West 
Frontier region, and Rajputana.59 By 1914, there were 552 infantry companies in the Indian 
Army of which 211 were composed of men from the Punjab, 121 were composed of men from 
the North-West Frontier region, 80 companies were composed of Nepalese Gurkhas, and the 
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remaining 140 coming from other regions.60 That year, 75 percent of the Indian Army was 
recruited from the martial races.61 
In 1903, the Indian Army underwent major structural reforms. Up into this this point the 
British government had preserved the British East India Company basic structure of three 
Presidency armies in India, with the Punjab essentially being treated as a separate entity. 
However, in 1903 the Command-in-Chief of the Indian Army Lord Kitchener abolished the old, 
tripartite structure and created a single, unified, centralized Indian Army. All of the infantry 
battalions and cavalry regiment were renumbered in sequential order and the remaining Punjabi 
irregular forces were integrated into the regular army.62 
The outbreak of the First World War brought India, along with the rest of the British 
Empire, into armed conflict with the Central Powers. During 1914 the old system of recruitment 
continued. In 1915, the system broke down under the manpower requirements of the war and 
twenty-two hitherto “non-martial” classes were added to the recruitment pool.63 In 1917, a new 
system of territorial recruitment was instated with recruitment centers opening in regions of India 
where no recruitment had ever happened before. Despite these efforts to expand the recruitment 
pool of the India Army by the end of the First World War, still 40 percent of the soldiers in the 
combat arms of the Indian Army were from Punjab.64 Combined Punjab and the United Province 
provided three fourths of the all Indian Army recruits during the First World War.65  
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 The Indian Army in the 1920s and 1930s had three tasks: internal security, external 
defense, and imperial garrisoning.66 The Indian Army was used to put down rebellions in Burma, 
responded to unrest in Punjab and the North West Frontier Province, control mass nationalist 
activist, and reign in communal violence.67 It was believed by British leaders that the Soviet 
Union was a grave threat to India. The Indian Army during this time period trained to fight the 
Soviets in Afghanistan and Iran if a war was to break out between the two powers. The Nazi-
Soviet Pact of August 1939 made possibility of a war between Britain and the Soviet Union seem 
increasingly likely.68 Finally, Indian soldiers were garrisoned throughout the British Empire in 
far flung locales like Egypt, the British Mandates of Iraq and Palestine, the Persian Gulf, Aden, 
Cyprus, Malaya, and China.69 
The outbreak of the Second World War led to the Indian Army growing from a force of 
120,000 soldiers to a force of 2,000,000 soldiers by the end of the war.70  Wartime manpower 
requirement forced changes to the commual composition of the Indian Army. There were nearly 
no Bengalis in the Indian Army before the war, but Bengalis were 4 percent of the wartime 
Army. Before the outbreak of hostilities, only 3 percent of the Army was from southern India. 
During the war, southern India provided 18 percent of the soldiers in Indian Army.71 The share 
of Indian soldiers from the overrepresented Muslim community fell from 35 percent to 25 
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percent and Sikh representation fell from 18 percent to 4.6 percent. 72 However, the “martial 
race” communities were still overrepresented in the Indian Army. In the Second World War, 32 
percent of the total recruitable male population of Punjab served and 53 percent of the recruitable 
male population of North West Frontier Province while only 12 percent of the recruitable male 
population of southern India served.73 Hindus mobilized 12 percent of the total recruitable Hindu 
male population into the Army, while Muslims mobilized 21 percent of the total recruitable 
Muslim male population into the Army.74 Army units composed of soldiers from “martial” 
groups were more likely to be deployed in combat than units composed of soldiers from “non-
martial” groups. “Non-martial” units were often assigned to support, logistics, and administrative 
roles. Only 5 percent of the infantry of the Indian Army came from “non-martial” groups.75 
Independence brought a more representative Indian Army.76 The terroritally and 
regimental rearrangements of Partition decrease the overrepresentation of Muslim Punjabis and 
the underrepresentation of Bengalis in the Indian Army.77 Members of Paraliament, seeking to 
provide jobs for their voting base, from “non-martial” regions and communities, pushed the 
Army to open up to the whole country.78 But the Army has worked to protect its British inherited 
recruitment patterns. The Army’s leadership felt, as seen in Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw’s 
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colorful quotation earlier in this thesis, civilian political interference in the operation of the Army 
would leave India dangerously open to attack.79 Then India underperformed in its war with 
China in 1962. To respond the Indian government increased the size of the Army from 458,000 
soldiers to 825,000 soldiers.80 Most of the growth came from raising new “martial” units.81 It 
was this newly reinforced Indian Army that fought against Pakistan in 1965 and 1971. 
Creation of the Martial Classes 
Rand and Wagner argue that the groups included in the “martial races” were not just 
loyal to the British during the 1857 uprising, but living in areas that are geographically closer to 
the new threats to British rule in India, namely the North Western frontier with Afghanistan and 
Russia. 82  The inclusion of groups in the “martial race” category was more geographical than 
racial.83  They also maintain that “martial races” has been ascribed a too central role in analysis 
of colonial recruitment.84 Ray argues that martial races constructed as a product of colonial 
discourse.85 Ray challenges two arguments that rival his constructivist narrative of the creation of 
the “martial races”. The first argument restates the view of colonial historiographers that the 
“martial races” composed of the pre-colonial military power and not a product of colonial 
discourse. The second argument is that colonial recruitment practices were idiosyncratic. The 
“martial race” was a constructed identity in some cases, but not others.86 Ray finds that ethnic 
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groups that had developed state-like structures in the precolonial period were significantly 
underrepresented in colonial security forces compared to ethnic groups that were stateless in the 
precolonial period. Additionally, ethnic groups that provided stiff resistance against attempts by 
the colonial state to extend its power were significantly underrepresented compared to ethnic 
groups that offered weak resistance or simply acquiesced to colonial domination.  
Barua argues that climate and biological science were key factors in creating “martial 
races”. The British viewed the tropical climate of Indian plains and lowlands as unhealthy. 
Consequently, the British believed that groups that live in hills and mountains were healthier and 
better fit to be soldiers.87 The British used physical measurements or anthropometry to determine 
whether an individual belonged to a “healthy”, “martial race”. Biological sciences, in particular 
Darwinian eugenics, were key to Victorian racism. Caste, and other groups, were thought to be 
biological rather than social phenomenon.88 Herbert Hope Risley wrote in his 1915 book The 
People of India, that the caste of an individual could be identified by measuring the nose: the 
finer noses belonged to higher caste groups while the coarser noses belonged to the lower caste 
groups.89 Barua also notes that, unlike the arguments put forward by India’s nationalist 
historians, there are no period documents to indicate that British developed the “martial race 
theory” as policy of “divide and rule”.90 Although the policy may have that effect. 
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Data and Methodology  
The Universe of Cases 
 The universe of cases for this study is the infantry wing of the Indian Army. The infantry 
wing of the Indian Army is divided into 31 regiments. Each regiment has its own history, 
tradition, esprit de corps, and is responsible for recruiting and training its own soldiers. Infantry 
regiments are divided into battalions. The number of battalions in a regiment range from 2 to 28 
depending on the regiment. There are a total of 450 infantry battalions in the Indian Army. Most 
of the infantry battalions are divided in four companies and there are approximately 1800 
infantry companies in the Indian Army.     
 I focused on the infantry wing of the Indian Army in this study for two reasons. First, 
there is a large and detailed body of works on the history of the infantry wing of the Indian 
Army. This allowed me to build a detailed data set of individual infantry companies of the Indian 
Army. There was no clear source of data on the operational history of the other wings of the 
Indian Army. Second, fortunately the infantry is the core of the Indian Army. All of the other 
branches of the Indian Army, including amour and artillery, are merely support functions. 
Therefore the core manifestation of the Indian Army is the characteristics of the infantry branch. 
Independent Variable 
The independent variable is the degree of martial identity a class is assigned to an 
infantry company.  Each infantry company of the Indian Army is either an “All-India” unit, 
fixed, or single class composition unit. Was the class composing a company defined as a “martial 
race” group by the British?  In particular, I am interested in whether or not a group was defined 
as martial group in the late 1930s, before the British Empire joined World War Two. The late 
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1930s was the last period of time in which the Indian Army was run by the British in a time of 
relative peacetime operations. It is important to draw measurement on the “martialness” of 
particular groups as close to the end of the British colonial period because martial identity, like 
other social constructs, was constantly shifting. Therefore, older sources that contain data on 
martial identity from the 1880s and 1890s cannot be relied on to give an accurate account of 
martial identity when India becomes an independent country in 1947. Part of the problem of 
measuring martial identity is that the English spelling of names of groups in various non-English 
languages change over time and between authors. The lack of standard English names for the 
various groups in the India means that there is some uncertainty about whether two authors are 
discussing the same group or different groups. Measuring the independent variable presents the 
fundamental problem of trying to statically define a social construct that in each case is defined 
differently (See Appendix A). This is the greatest source of error in measuring the independent 
variable. The degree of “martialness” of a class changes. Class identity changes over time. The 
names of classes, and spellings of these names, change over time. This study is an imperfect 
attempt to statistically measure some that is not measured but felt and known. 
This study drawing on two sources to measure the independent variable. First is a book 
written by Lieut-General Sir George MacMunn titled The Martial Races of India. MacMunn was 
the Colonel Commandant of the Royal Artillery and served in India. He was a prolific writer of 
titles such as The Armies of India, The Official History of the World War—Egypt and Palestine 
1914-17, and Gustavus Adolphus: The Northern Hurricane. The Martial Races of India was 
written in 1933 and gives a detailed history of the different “Martial Races”. The book is cited in 
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a number of academic studies of the “Martial Race” theory.91 On pages 236-237, MacMunn 
provides a list of the groups in India that are considered to be “Martial Races” (Appendix B). 
This study checks MacMunn’s list of “Martial Races” groups in India in 1933 against 
data on the composition of the Indian Army right before the outbreak of World War Two, and 
before the large group of the Indian Army during the war that led to a temporary end of the 
“Martial Races” theory of recruitment. This data can be found in Wilkinson’s book Army and 
Nation: The Military and Indian Democracy since Independence.92 The composition data serves 
as a measure of the practical effect of the “Martial Races” theory of recruitment. Appendix C is a 
chart showing the percentage of different population groups serving in the Indian Army before 
World War Two and the total size of each population group. The chart demonstrates that before 
World War Two some small groups, like Dogras, Gujars, and Kumaonis, had disproportionally 
high service percentages while some large groups, like Other Hindus and Madras Classes, had 
disproportionately low service percentages. Groups that are denoted with asterisks (i.e. *Ahirs*) 
are considered for the point of this study to be “Martial”. Groups denoted with asterisks are both 
listed by MacMunn and by the Wilkinson service data as being a “Martial Class”. This study 
needs to address some inconsistencies about this list of “Martial” classes. Gurkhas are left off the 
list of “Martial” classes because they are mostly from Nepal. Pathans and Baluchis, despite being 
listed as “Martial” classes by MacMunn and having a high pre-war service percentage are 
excluded from this study because they are from areas that are now in Pakistan. I have been, as of 
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yet, unable to determine is the Meos group in Wilkinson and the Mers group in MacMunn are the 
same groups and authors misspelled or the names changed over time, or are they different 
groups. Muslim Punjabis are a less significant part of the post-independence Indian Army than 
the colonial Indian Army because many of the Muslim Punjabi units were transfer to the 
Pakistani Army. 
 A list of which groups are considered to be “Martial” classes provides us with the ability 
to code units, down to the Battalion and even Company level, as either being composed of 
“Martial” classes or not being composed of “Martial” classes. P.K. Gautam’s book Composition 
And Regimental System Of The Indian Army: Continuity and Change provides a chart with the 
class composition of all the Regiments in the Army.93 Next, regimental histories provide 
accounts of which units in each regiment see action during the four major wars this study is 
considering.94 From these two sets of data we can measure whether or not Indian Army units that 
are composed of “Martial” classes see combat more than units that are composed of other 
classes. 
Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable is the binary value of whether or not an infantry company made 
contact, saw combat attack, with the enemy during a particular war. This data was collected by 
reading secondary historical sources that record the service history of each infantry company, 
(see Appendix D for list of sources cited in collecting company service history). As source of 
error in the collection process is that I could not consult every possible source ever written as 
some could not be retrieved by the interlibrary loans system at Earl Greeg Swem Library at The 
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College of William and Mary. It is possible that some companies that made contact with the 
enemy were not recorded in my data set as having done so as I could not find a source that 
recorded this action. Another source of error is the sometimes ambiguous wording some of the 
sources used that made it unclear the exact nature a units wartime activities. I tended to err on the 
side of caution and if a text description did not use phrases like “shoot at” or “attacked the 
enemy’s position” the unit was not coded as having made contact with the enemy. It is possible 
that this practice led to some errors of admission. Finally, some infantry regiments had more 
written about them which made data collection easier as more sources available.  
Control Variable: Distance between Regimental Headquarters to frontline. 
Controlling for the variable of distance between Regimental Headquarters to the frontline 
is important because it eliminates the geographic proximity as causal mechanism for unit 
deployment. The locations of each infantry regiment’s headquarters are in listed in Indian Army 
(A Reference Manual) by Lt. Col. Gautam Sharma (Retd.).95 Locate each Regimental 
Headquarters with the decimal GDP coordinates of the city the each Regimental Headquarters is 
located in.96 Next, create a map with state level administrative boundaries for India and national 
administrative borders for Pakistan and Bangladesh. Create new layers for Jammu and Kashmir 
and for Arunachal Pradesh (formerly known as the North-East Frontier Agency). Project whole 
map into the Asia Equaldistance Conic North projection. Insert Regimental Headquarters by 
adding points on the GPS coordinates for the cities in which each Regimental Headquarters are 
located in. Use the Near tool to measure the distance between each Regimental Headquarters and 
the four areas of combat. For the 1947-8 Kashmir War, distance from each Regimental 
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Headquarters to Jammu and Kashmir. For the 1962 India-China War, distance from each 
Regimental Headquarters to Jammu and Kashmir and to what was then called the North-East 
Frontier Agency (renamed Arunachal Pradesh in 1972). For the 1965 India-Pakistan War, 
distance from each Regimental headquarters to Pakistan which stands in as a proxy for West 
Pakistan in 1965. For the 1971 India-Pakistan War, distance from each Regimental headquarters 
to Pakistan which stands in as a proxy for West Pakistan in 1971 and to Bangladesh which stands 
in as a proxy for East Pakistan in 1971. For each company, take the distance from where their 
Regimental Headquarters was at the time of the war, found in Indian Army (A Reference 
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 Indian Army infantry companies that were composed of a “martial” class group are more 
likely to have seen combat in the Kashmir 1947-8, Sino-India 1962, India-Pakistan 1965, India-
Pakistan 1971 Wars than infantry units that were composed of a “non-martial” class group. The 
unit of analysis in this section is unit,war. Each infantry company appears four times in the data 
set. Each time the unit is linked to either the Kashmir 1947-8 War, the Sino-India 1962 War, the 
India-Pakistan 1965 War, or the India-Pakistan 1971 War.  Across all wars there were 5,236 
unit,war cases, or 5,236 individual companies being deployed in individual wars. Of those 5,236 
unit,war cases, 2,019 or 38.56 percent were “non-martial” cases. The other 3,217 or 61.44 
percent were “martial” cases. In other words, across the all four wars 38.56 percent of potential 
infantry company deployments were of “non-martial” units and 61.44 percent of potential 
infantry company deployments were of “martial” units. Across all four wars, 63.92 percent, 2.48 
percentage points above the proportion, of the potential infantry companies deployed in combat 
were “martial” class companies. The share of infantry companies in the Indian Army with a 
“martial” class composition fell between the 1947-8 and the 1962 wars from 62.5 percent to 
60.68 percent. After the 1962 war, as the Indian Army was rapidly expanded,98 the percentage of 
“martial” infantry companies grew from 60.68 percent to 61.99 percent in 1965. By 1971, the 
percentage of “martial” infantry fell from 61.99 percent to 60.79 percent. 
Across all four wars, 36.08 percent, 2.48 percentage points below the proportion, of the 
potential infantry companies deployed in combat were “non-martial” class companies. Of 
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“martial” class infantry companies 36.08 percent of potential deployments resulted in actual 
deployments, while 69.60 percent of potential deployments did not result in actual deployments. 
Of “non-martial” class infantry companies 27.34 percent of potential deployments resulted in 
actual deployments, while 72.44 percent of potential deployments did not result in actual 
deployments. Infantry companies with martial composition are more likely to have seen combat 
deployment during the four wars observed than infantry companies without martial composition. 
Martialness have a 3 percentage point effect on whether or not an infantry company saw combat 
across all wars. Since the control is “non-martial” infantry company, which was 41.18 percent of 
the army, the 3 percentage point effect is 7.28 percent increase in the likelihood of a company 
seeing combat if they are a “martial” company. 7.28 percent of an Army with 5,236 posable 
company combat deployment across 4 wars is 381 companies.  
 In all regressions, distance, the measure of the distance from a Regimental Headquarters 
to frontlines, had no effective on the likelihood of a company being deployed in combat. 
Distance is measured in meters and is not inverted so the higher the value, the greater the 
distance from a Regimental Headquarters to the frontlines. Martialness does not seem to be 
affected by distance to the frontline. When distance is control for the effect of martialness 
increase during the Sino-India War 1962 and the India-Pakistan War 1971, with the inverse 
being true for the Kashmir War 1947-8 and the India-Pakistan War 1965. This may have to do 
with the geographic direction of the war. Both the Kashmir War 1947-8 and the India-Pakistan 
War 1965 were only fought along India north-western and western border in Jammu and 
Kashmir and along the border with West Pakistan. However, the Sino-India War 1962 and India-
Pakistan War 1971 had Eastern Theaters of action. In the Sino-India War 1962 there was fighting 
in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in the north and in the North East Frontier Agency. In the 
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India-Pakistan War 1971 there was fighting in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in the north, 





62.5 60.68 61.99 60.79









1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975






















1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975
Percentage of Indian Army Infantry Companies The Engaged in 
Combat 
Engaged in combat Did not engage in combat
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Table 5: Effect of Martialness on Battlefiled Combat Across All Wars  
 
Table 5. All Wars 
 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Martialness 0.03** 0.098*** 0.03** 0.098*** 





















Effects No No Yes Yes 
Observations 5,236 5,236 5,236 5,236 
This table reports coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from 
OLS regressions. The dependent variable is whether a given Indian Army 
infantry unit served on the frontlines (i.e., experienced contact with the 




Kashmir War 1947-48 
 In the aftermath of the Partition of India into India and Pakistan in August 1947, India 
and Pakistan fought a war over control of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. Hari Singh, 
the Maharaja of Kashmir, was a Hindu Dogra but 75 percent of his subjects were Muslim. Both 
governments of the newly created countries of India and Pakistan wanted Singh to annex his 
princely state to their country. Singh wanted to maintain the independence of his polity. 
However, an internal revolt backed by Pakistani tribesmen threatened the summer capital of 
Srinagar, and in October, Singh was forced to annex his state to India and ask for Indian military 
intervention to push back the rebels and interlopers. Pakistani forces mobilized to support the 
tribesmen and the two armies squared off against each other over course the 1948. By the end the 
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year, the conflict ended in a stalemate with two countries drawing a de facto border along the 
Line Of Control through Jammu and Kashmir.99   
 Of the infantry companies that did see combat during the war, 63.85 percent were 
“martial”, 1.35 percentage points above the proportion of infantry companies that had a “martial” 
composition. Conversely, 36.15 percent of infantry companies deployed had a “non-martial” 
composition. Among the “martial” infantry companies, 18.89 percent of them saw combat during 
the Kashmir War 1947-8. Among the “non-martial” infantry companies, 17.82 percent of them 
saw combat during the Kashmir War 1947-8. Martialness have a 1.1 percentage point effect on 
whether or not an infantry company saw combat during the Kashmir War 1947-8. Since the 
control is “non-martial” infantry company, which was 37.5 percent of the army, the 1.1 
percentage point effect is 2.93 percent increase in the likelihood of company seeing combat if 
they are a “martial” company. 2.93 percent of an Army with 1,152 company is 34 companies. 
The effect of martialness is that 34 infantry companies of the Indian Army saw combat in the 
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Table 6:  Battlefield Contact during Kashmir War 1947-8 
 
Table 7: Effect of Martialness on Battlefiled Combat in Kashmir War, 1947-1948 
 
Kashmir War 1947-48 
 
       (1) (2) 
Martialness 0.011 -0.085** 













Observations 1,152 1,136 
This table reports coefficients and standard errors (in 
parentheses) from OLS regression. The dependent variable is 
whether a given Indian Army infantry unit served on the 
frontlines (i.e., experienced contact with the enemy). * p<0.1, 
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Sino-India War 1962 
 In 1962, Indian Army patrols along the border with China in the North East Frontier 
Agency (NEFA) (renamed Arunachal Pradesh in 1972) and the Ladakh region of Jammu and 
Kashmir can across Chinese outputs in disputed territory. The Chinese forces attack Indian 
patrols in the NEFA in an effort to distract from a road building project in Ladakh linking Tibet 
with Xinjiang, China. As the border clashes escalated, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru 
was unwilling to deploy more military forces to the frontier as he believed he could negotiate a 
solution to the conflict with the Chinese government. The lack of deployment of additional 
Indian Army forces to the border allowed for the Chinese military to defeat the Indian forces that 
were in the area. The Chinese military, after demonstrating its ability to launch a successful 
attack into Indian territory, withdraw its forces.100   
 Due to the surprise nature of the Chinese attack on Indian forces and the unwillingness of 
Indian political leaders to deploy more military forces to the border, less than 8 percent of the 
infantry companies of the Indian Army saw combat action during the Sino-Indian War. “…only 
24,000 of the Indian Army’s approximately 550,000 personnel took part in the war…”101 Of the 
infantry companies that did see combat during the war, 74.22 percent were “martial”, 13.45 
percentage points above the proportion of infantry companies that had a “martial” composition. 
Conversely, 25.77 percent of infantry companies deployed had a “non-martial” composition. 
Among the “martial” infantry companies, 9.68 percent of them saw combat during the Sino-
Indian War 1962. Among the “non-martial” infantry companies, 5.19 percent of them saw 
combat during the Sino-Indian War 1962. Martialness have a 4.5 percentage point effect on 
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whether or not an infantry company saw combat during the Sino-Indian War 1962. Since the 
control is “non-martial” infantry company, which was 39.31 percent of the army, the 4.5 
percentage point effect is 11.45 percent increase in the likelihood of company seeing combat if 
they are a “martial” company. 11.45 percent of an Army with 1,226 company is 140 companies.  
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Table 9: Effect of Martialness on Battlefiled Combat in Sino-Indian War, 1962 
 Sino-Indian War 1962 
       (1) (2) (3) 
Martialness 0.045** 0.162*** 0.166*** 









          
Contact in Previous 
war 
  0.147*** 
(0.026) 









Observations 1,226 1,210 1,136 
This table reports coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from OLS 
regression. The dependent variable is whether a given Indian Army infantry unit 
served on the frontlines (i.e., experienced contact with the enemy). * p<0.1, 
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01    
 
  
India-Pakistan War 1965 
 On 7 August 1965, the Pakistani Army sent about 7,000 lightly armed guerrillas into 
Indian controlled Kashmir with the goal of fermenting revolt. The Indian Army moved quickly 
against the Pakistani backed Kashmiri rebels and seized some of the Pakistani outposts. The 
Pakistani Army responded on 31 August by launching a full-scale assault on Indian territory. The 
Indian Army responded with attack directed at Lahore, the capital of Pakistani Punjab. By the 
end of September both militaries were running low on foreign military supplies, artillery shells in 
particular, leading to a cease-fire and in February 1966 the Soviet Union mediated the conflict to 
an official end.102 
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 The Indian Army was much more prepared for fighting a war with Pakistan than it was 
for a conflict with China and as such 37.73 percent of the infantry companies were deployed in 
combat. Of the infantry companies that did see combat during the war, 65.21 percent were 
“martial”, 3.22 percentage points above the proportion of infantry companies that had a “martial” 
composition. Conversely, 34.79 percent of infantry companies deployed had a “non-martial” 
composition. Among the “martial” infantry companies, 34.46 percent of them saw combat during 
the India-Pakistan War 1965. Among the “non-martial” infantry companies, 39.75 percent of 
them saw combat during the India-Pakistan War 1965. Martialness has a 5.3 percentage point 
effect on whether or not an infantry company saw combat during the India-Pakistan War 1965. 
Since the control is “non-martial” infantry company, which was 38.04 percent of the army, the 
5.3 percentage point effect is 13.9 percent increase in the likelihood of company seeing combat if 
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Table 10: Battlefield Contact during Indian-Pakistan War 1965 
 
Table 11: Effect of Martialness on Battlefiled Combat in Indian-Pakistan War 1965 
 
India-Pakistan War 1965 
 
       (1) (2) (3) 
Martialness 0.053** 0.039 0.008 









          
Contact in Previous 
war   
0.507*** 
(.036) 









Observations 1,394 1,394 1,226 
This table reports coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from OLS 
regression. The dependent variable is whether a given Indian Army infantry unit 
served on the frontlines (i.e., experienced contact with the enemy). * p<0.1, 
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01    
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India-Pakistan War 1971 
 In 1970, Pakistan held national elections to legitimize the previous year’s military coup. 
The Awami League, an East-Pakistan based political party, won a majority of the seats in the 
National Assembly. All of the Awami League’s seats were in ethnically Bengal East-Pakistan. 
The mostly ethnically Punjabi West Pakistani military leadership did want to have a government 
led by the Awami League. Talks between West Pakistani and East Pakistani politicians broke 
down and on 24 March 1971 the Army declared martial law in East Pakistan. The Army moved 
quickly to deconstruct the Awami League and arrest its leadership, disband East Pakistani police 
and paramilitary units, and control the flow of information in and out of East Pakistan. Much of 
the leadership of the Awami League and the now disbanded East Pakistani security forces fled to 
India. A large number of refugees followed the Awami League into India. Among the refugees 
and former East Pakistani security forces armed rebel forces began to form and cross back into 
East Pakistan to wage an insurgency against the Pakistani Army. By mid-July, 7 million East 
Pakistani refugees were in India. The Indian government did not allow for any political 
settlement of the crisis that did not include the repatriation of these East Pakistani refugees. The 
Pakistani government did not want these refugees to be repatriated as the government viewed 
them as traitors. The Indian government did not want the conflict between the Bengali rebels and 
the Pakistani Army to continue, leading to more refugees crossing into India and the potential for 
a radical, battle-hardened, government coming to power in an Independent Bangladesh. On 3 
December 1971, the Indian military launched an attack on Pakistani forces in both East and West 
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Pakistan. On 16 December 1971, all Pakistani forces in East Pakistan surrendered to the Indian 
Army, ending the conflict and leading to the creation of an independent Bangladesh.103 
 As the Indian government was able to choose the time and place at which it started the 
full-scale war with Pakistan, it was able to fully mobilize its forces, consequently 47.4 percent of 
available infantry companies saw combat. Of the infantry companies that did see combat during 
the war, 61.53 percent were “martial”, 0.74 percentage points above the proportion of infantry 
companies that had a “martial” composition. Conversely, 38.47 percent of infantry companies 
deployed had a “non-martial” composition. Among the “martial” infantry companies, 47.98 
percent of them saw combat during the India-Pakistan War 1971. Among the “non-martial” 
infantry companies, 46.52 percent of them saw combat during the India-Pakistan War 1971. 
Martialness has a 1.5 percentage point effect on whether or not an infantry company saw combat 
during the India-Pakistan War 1971. Since the control is “non-martial” infantry company, which 
was 39.21 percent of the army, the 1.5 percentage point effect is 3.83 percent increase in the 
likelihood of company seeing combat if they are a “martial” company. 3.83 percent of an Army 
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Table 12: Battlefield Contact during Indian-Pakistan War 1971 
 
Table 13: Effect of Martialness on Battlefiled Combat in Indian-Pakistan War 1971 
 
India-Pakistan War 1971 
 
       (1) (2) (3) 
Martialness 0.015 0.152*** 0.150*** 









          
Contact in Previous 
war   
0.278*** 
(0.026) 









Observations 1,464 1,464 1,402 
This table reports coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from OLS 
regression. The dependent variable is whether a given Indian Army infantry unit 
served on the frontlines (i.e., experienced contact with the enemy). * p<0.1, 
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01    
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Implications 
Military Service and Citizenship 
 Military service is one of, if not the, hallmarks of citizenship in a modern country, 
particularly in a political democracy.104 In the late 18th Century – early 19th Century, states had to 
deploy increasing large militaries to fight wars. This pattern of mass mobilization required states 
to make compromises with the masses. No longer were the masses just mere feudal subjects. 
Through conscription the masses became citizens with political and civil rights previously 
reserved for the nobility.105 Through the same process, the idea of the citizen-soldier was created. 
The military, composted by citizen-soldiers, demonstrates the legitimacy of the government from 
the point of view of the citizens.106 Citizens demonstrate their loyalty to country through military 
service and in exchange they receive the benefits of citizenship from the state.107 Without 
citizenship, a national military is essentially a mercenary force.108  
However, citizenship is not just a legal definition but a standing within society.109  Within 
societies, different constructed groups have different positions in the hierarchy. Some groups, 
those with access to political, economic, and social power, are dominant groups. Other groups, 
those denied access to political, economic, and social power, are subordinate groups. Militaries 
can reflect civilian inequalities within their organizations, but groups that gain power in the 
military can convert that power into social positions in civilian life.110 Subordinate groups can try 
                                                          
104 Morris Janowitz, “Military Institutions and Citizenship in Western Societies.” Armed Forces and Society 2, no. 2 
(February 1976), 191. 
105 Ibid, 186. 
106 Ibid, 190. 
107 Ibid, 191. 
108 James Burk, “Citizenship Status and Military Service: The Quest for Inclusion by Minorities and Conscientious 
Objectors.” Armed Forces & Society 21, no. 4 (Summer 1995), 506. 
109 Ibid, 504. 
110 Yagil Levy, “Militarizing Inequality: A Conceptual Framework.” Theory and Society 27, no. 6 (1998), 873. 
Frederick Harteis 50 
 
to gain access to a societal position through service in the military. Military service leads to the 
development of social capital which can advance individual and group status in society.111  
However, inequality is built into the military.112 The military ranks their members with 
ranks and unit assignments. Different units have different statuses, often with front-line combat 
units privileged over rear support units.113 Societies, in particular militarized societies, and 
militaries tend to prize the combat units in a military over non-combat units. Combat units are 
glorified through heroic imagery of the combat soldier that marginalizes the non-combat units 
and the non-militarized identities.114 The dominant groups in society had greater ability to access 
the higher statuses positions in the military.115 The dominant groups in the military will try to 
maintain it privilege by erecting barriers to advancement to subordinate groups in the military.116  
However, subordinate groups may find themselves able to advance through the military if there 
is a military need for rapid growth, if the subordinate groups are able to put pressure on the 
military to allow their members to advance through the ranks, or if there is a declining 
recruitment levels from the dominant groups.117  The status subordinate groups attain in the 
military matter socially to the degree to which military service grants access to social networks 
outside the military and the dominant groups do not have civilian avenues through which they 
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can maintain their dominance. The military accomplishments, and associated heroic myths and 
symbols, become a “currency” that the subordinate groups can use to socially advance.118 
Subordinate groups can cite their military activities, deploying the norm of the citizen-soldier, in 
order to demand civilian quid pro quos.119 Janowitz and Burk demonstrate that African 
Americans have used service in the US military as a means to gain greater political, civil, 
economic rights in the United States.120  
Blood Sacrifice 
 A mechanism I would like to propose for how political actors turn military service into 
political power is the blood sacrifice. Blood sacrifice is the practice of a group’s political leaders 
using the death of members of the group in the military make demands of the political system. 
Political leaders use memory of the death of service members as a point to rally the group 
together and demonstrates the loyalty of the group to country. As the military and the civilian 
government can determine who is deployed in combat operations, they can determine who has 
access to blood sacrifice and who does not. In this way the government and the military can 
choose which groups have access to the material benefits being able to deploy blood sacrifice in 
political contests. 
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Three examples of blood sacrifice are the memorialization of the 54th Massachusetts 
Regiment and Col. Robert Gould Shaw after the American Civil War, the remembrance of the 
36th Division of British Army during the Battle of Somme by Ulster Unionists in Northern 
Ireland, and the political rhetoric of Azam Khan during the 2014 Indian General Elections. A 
fourth example, the breakdown in relations between the Sikh community and Indian government 
in the 1980s, shows the limitation of blood sacrifice in advancing a community’s interests in the 
political system. 
The 54th Massachusetts, The Battle of Fort Wagner, and memory in the Jim Crow Era 
In 1863, Governor of Massachusetts, John A. Andrew announced that the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts would raise a regiment of African Americans to fight in the 
US Army against the Confederacy in the American Civil War. The 54th Massachusetts Regiment 
was the first African American regiment raised for the US Army since the issuance of the 
Emancipation Proclamation and the first African American regiment raised in the North.121 The 
initial efforts to raise 1,000 African American soldiers from Massachusetts failed with only 133 
men volunteering.122 The rest of the soldiers came from other states of the Union, occupied 
Confederate territory, Canada, and the West Indies. More soldiers in the 54th Massachusetts were 
from Pennsylvania (294 soldiers), New York (183 soldiers), and Ohio (155 soldiers) than from 
Massachusetts.123 These soldiers, after being trained in Massachusetts under the leadership of 
Col. Robert Gould Shaw on 28 May 1863 paraded through Boston, along Beacon Street between 
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the State House and the Boston Common on their way to the transport ship in the Harbor.124 This 
moment was seen by many observers a great step for African American as they could prove that 
they were worthy of being citizens by taking action to end slavery. Along the paraded route 
people were selling souvenirs reading “Those who would be free, themselves must strike the 
blow.”125 However the Boston Irish community resented the African American soldiers because 
the Irish competed with African Americans for employment. The Irish were concerned that 
military service would give African Americans more status and thus crowd the Irish out of 
jobs.126 
The 54th Massachusetts left Boston and were deployed in the coastal Sea Islands of South 
Carolina. The US military was working to take back control of the City of Charleston and to do 
that they needed to take Fort Wagner, which guarded the seaward entrance to the harbor. Col. 
Shaw requested that the 54th Massachusetts be assigned the task of being the first regiment in a 
direct assault on Fort Wagner. On 18 July 1863, the 54th Massachusetts was waiting for evening 
to fall to begin their assault on the fort.127 As they stood there, they knew about the pivotal 
battles that had finished fifteen days earlier at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania and Vicksburg, 
Mississippi. However, they had also heard about the outbreak of violence in New York City five 
days earlier. Laborers had engaged in a violent riot after the announcement of a new law that 
allowed for someone to avoid being conscripted into the US Army by paying a substitute to take 
his place. The rioters, instead of targeting the wealthy plutocrats and powerful government 
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officials responsible for the measure, beat and shot African Americans and known abolitionists, 
dragging their bodies through the streets of the city and then strung the bodies up in place 
spaces.128 The soldiers of the 54th Massachusetts, some of whom had families living in New 
York City, knew about these riots that showed that they were not full citizens of the country for 
which they were about to die to preserve. When the signal came, Col. Shaw led the 600 (well 
under the strength of a typical regiment of 1,000 soldiers) tired, hungry soldiers, who had just 
seen their first combat two days earlier, down the beach towards Fort Wagner.129   
Fort Wagner was massive structure. Its garrison of 1,700 had spent the day holed up in 
the bomb proof shelter as US Naval vessels shelled the fort. Due to a protective barricade, none 
of the fort’s artillery had been damaged during the shelling. As the 54th Massachusetts advanced, 
the few thousand yards down narrow beach between the Atlantic Ocean and a tidal swamp the 
“monstrous mound of sand and earth” loomed up in front of them.130 At eighty yards, the 
Confederate defenders unleashed grape-shot and canisters on to the advancing US soldiers.131 
One of the 54th Massachusetts’ officers later recalled that he saw “A sheet of flame, followed by 
a running fire, like electric sparks, swept along the parapet.”132 The Regiment reached the fort, 
crossed the moat, and scrambled up the rampart. Col. Shaw was quickly killed. His remaining 
soldiers charged up the slope of the fort under heavy fire. The wounded and the dead tumbled 
headlong down the slope of the rampart, coming to rest in the moat. Some who were still alive 
drowned in the salty water.133 The next wave of support did not come fast enough and the 54th 
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Massachusetts had to withdraw without taking the fort.134 Of the 600 soldiers of the 54th 
Massachusetts Regiment that took part in the battle, 272 were killed, wounded, or captured, a 45 
percent casualty rate.135 Over the course of the American Civil War, 1,345 men served in the 54th 
Massachusetts, with 270 dying in some fashion, a 20 percent casualty rate.136 
After the Battle of Fort Wagner there was a desired to memorialize the memory of Col. 
Shaw and the 54th Massachusetts. Gov. Andrew appointed a committee to erect a fitting 
monument in Boston.137 The committee took until 1897 to finish the project. The committee 
hired Augustus Saint-Gaudens to sculpt a bronze monument. While Saint-Gaudens wanted to 
just make a statue of Shaw, Shaw’s parents demanded that the monument also depict the African 
American soldiers who served under him parading along Beacon Street through Boston.138 When 
the monument was unveiled to the public on 31 May 1897, it was the only monument in the 
country to show African American soldiers in full military uniforms.139 The ceremony on that 
day featured a gathering of 60 veterans from the 54th Massachusetts marching “proudly up the 
hill to do honor to their fallen comrade.”140 At the ceremony, Booker T. Washington gave 
meaning to the loss of life. 
What these heroic souls of the 54th Regiment began, we must 
complete…If through me, a humble representative, nearly ten 
millions of my people might be permitted to send a message to 
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Massachusetts, to the survivors of the 54th Regiment…to the 
family who their only boy that we might have life more 
abundantly, that message would be: Tell them that the sacrifice 
was not in vain, that up from the depths of ignorance and poverty 
we are coming…by way of the school, the well-cultivated field, the 
skilled hand…we are coming up…141 
The monument gave meaning to the loss of life at Fort Wagner. But by 1897, the gains for 
African Americans won in the blood of the Civil War had been eroded by the entrenchment of 
Jim Crow era white supremacy. In an effort to resist Jim Crow, African American used the 
memory of the blood sacrifice of 54th Massachusetts to remind the government of what it owed 
them. The 54th Massachusetts Monument is prominently displayed on Beacon Street, Boston 
facing the Massachusetts Statehouse, the residence of the political institutions the bore the moral 
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The 36th Ulster Division, The Battle of the Somme, and remembrance in Troubled Northern 
Ireland143 
 On the first day of The Battle of the Somme, 1 July 1916, the 36th Division of the British 
Army went over the top of their trenches and charged towards the German lines. In the course of 
that day 5,000 soldiers, of a total strength of 15,000, died.144 The 36th Division of the British 
Army was composed of Protestants from Ulster in Ireland. The first of July was a day heavy with 
meaning for Ireland’s Protestant community for it was the anniversary of one of the defeats of 
the Irish Catholics to William of Orange at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690.145 Now in 1916 Irish 
Protestants were once again fighting for King and Country. To quote the 36th Division’s 
commanding officer, “We could hardly have a date better calculated to inspire national traditions 
among our men of the North.”146 The heavy losses on the first day of the Somme, 5,000 sons, 
fathers, brothers, husbands, was a heavy total for the Ulster Protestant community. The losses on 
the first day of the Somme was a shared moment of sacrifice for the community as everyone 
knew someone who lost someone in service to their country. “The Battle of the Somme became 
the archetype of Ulster’s loyalty and defense of the crown.”147  
 The Ulster Protestant community was quick to offer remembrance to the death of 1 July. 
The response to the first day of The Battle of the Somme was at the same time deeply personal and 
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extremely political. Unionism, the idea the now partitioned Northern Ireland should remain in the 
United Kingdom, made it worthwhile for Ulstermen to die for their country, allowing families to 
make sense of their grief.148 Sarah Mailey marked the death of her husband, Lance-Corporal John 
Mailey, with short newspaper notice:  
For King and Country well he stood 
Unknown to coward’s fears 
In battles strife he shed his blood 
With the Ulster Volunteers.149 
By 1918, 1 July was cemented as an annual day of remembrance for the Orange Order, a 
Masonic-style fraternity sworn to maintain the Protestant Ascendancy in Ireland.150 During the 
interwar years, Unionists contrasted their service to King and Country at the Somme with the 
Easter Uprising that same year.151 One Sinn Fein leader commented that, “Unionists used the 
Somme sacrifice as a badge of loyalty to their new state and still do.”152 They were making the 
argument to British officials that they, and not the Catholics, were loyal and could be partners 
with the British officials in running Northern Ireland. Riding on that partnership was Protestant 
access to the levers of state and material benefits of controlling the government.  
 During The Troubles, a period of violence in Northern Ireland between the 1960s and 
1998, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), one of the Protestant paramilitary forces that was 
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responsible for some of the earliest killing, claimed the memory of the 36th Division for 
themselves.  They painted a number of murals along Shankill Road in Belfast depicting the 
soldiers of either the First World War or the 36th Division in particular alongside UVF gunmen. 
In this way the UVF is calling on this shared narrative of sacrifice and Protestant Ulster identity 
to justify their violent political actives in furtherance of their goal of maintain the British 
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Figure 6: Mural depicting the soldiers of the 36th Division charging in no-man’s at the Somme 
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Figure 7: Mural depicting four recipients of the Victoria Cross from the 36th Division with eh 
UVF emblem in the center.154 
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The Kargil War, Azam Khan, and the Indian General Election of 2014 
 On 7 April 2014 the Samajwadi Party (SP) had a political rally in Ghaziabad, Uttar 
Pradesh, India. At this rally Azam Khan, the leader of the SP, stood up and delivered some 
remarks to the assembled group.155 Translated from Hindi, his remarks read as following: 
People who intended to disturb harmony claimed that I called 
somebody dog. In this pathetic era of politics, mediapersons 
understand and admit your mistake. Who said that it pains if a 
puppy comes under the wheel of a car? Who calls us puppy? 
Narendra Modi called us puppy. Hindu soldiers did not conquer 
Kargil, however it was Muslim soldiers, who by chanting Allah-
uh-Akbar conquered Kargil.156 
Khan then went on to say, “Recruit us [Muslims] in to the Indian Army. No one can guard the 
borders of our nation better than us [Muslims].”157 Former Army Chief Gen. V K Singh, who 
was at the time a candidate for the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), responded by saying 
that the Kargil War was “won by Indian”. “Anybody who talks of caste, creed and religion in the 
army needs to be condemned. He may be anybody. The war was won by Indians and not by any 
casts, creed, society, religion.”158 In 2014, Azam Khan was campaigning against the BJP lead by 
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then Gujarati Chief Minister and Prime Ministerial candidate Narendra Modi. The BJP has 
gained a reputation for being “a party with a narrow communal agenda that aims to destroy the 
Indian secular state. Its objective is to establish its version of a Hindu state. The Muslim minority 
suspects that it will be violently suppressed and Hinduized in such a state.”159 In 2013, Modi was 
asked how he felt about the 2002 anti-Muslim riot that killed over 1,000 people in Gujarat. He 
responded, “If someone else is driving a car and we’re sitting behind, even then if a puppy comes 
under the wheel, will it be painful or not? Of course it is. If I’m a chief minister or not, I’m a 
human being. If something bad happens anywhere, it is natural to be sad.”160 This quotation 
caused controversy in India. First, it seemed to dismiss the terrible events of 2002. Second, it 
called Muslims, one fifth of the population of India, dogs. Third, once again Modi did not take 
responsibility for the violence that happened during his term as Chief Minister of Gujarat.  
 Khan, defending his party’s control of the state of Uttar Pradesh, used Modi 
inflammatory remarks to turn out Muslim voters against the BJP. The SP was at the time a 
communal collation of Muslims and Yadav, an Other Backward Class (OBC) group in Uttar 
Pradesh.161 Khan cites Modi’s previous statements about Muslims and then takes a hard right 
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hand turn and discusses the religion of the Indian soldiers who fought in the Kargil War. The 
Kargil War was a brief border conflict in 1999 between India and Pakistan along the Line Of 
Control in Kashmir. Pakistani forces infiltrated on to the Indian side of the Line Of Control and 
took up positions on the Kargil heights. Indian forces then pushed out the Pakistani forces. Khan 
was claiming that the Indian soldiers deployed in the Kargil War were Muslim not Hindu. This 
was such a controversial remark that the Election Commission banned him from public speaking 
afterwards.  Khan defended himself claiming that using Muslim soldiers was a tactic deployed 
by the Indian Army to confuse the Pakistani Army.162 Furthermore, “Expressing oneself is within 
the framework of law and it is my right to speak the right thing. I have only talked about 
sacrifices [emphasis added]. Whatever injustice happened, I have only spoken about that. I have 
not said anything other than facts. I have not threatened anyone. It is not my nature to threaten 
anybody.”163 
 In this incident we see a politician deploy a story of blood sacrifice in effort to win an 
election. Khan was claiming that Muslims were “doing the dying” for India and as such the 
Muslim party should be in power. This claim is false. A number of non-Muslim units were 
deployed in the Kargil War.164 Regardless of the validity of the claim, Khan was making a claim 
from the political process of India that his group should have special rights because of it service 
to the Indian state. Incidentally, Khan’s SP did not perform will in the 2014, wining only 5 of the 
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80 Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament, seats in Uttar Pradesh down from the 23 they had 
won in the previous General Election.165 
Operation Blue Star, Khalistan, and The Limits of Loyalty  
 At 7 p.m. on 5 June 1984, the Indian Army executed Operation Blue Star by opening fire 
with heavy artillery on the Golden Temple complex in Amritsar, Punjab, India, the center of the 
Sikh religion.166 At 10:30 pm, commandos entered the complex and engaged the occupants in 
combat. After the commandos were repealed, infantry units and tanks stormed the complex.167 
After between 500 and 1200 deaths, the Golden Temple complex was back in the hands of the 
Indian government.168 How had relations between the Indian government and a segment of the 
Punjabi Sikh community, a community whose loyalty to the Indian state had been a bedrock 
assumption for Indian security policy for decides, deteriorate to the point that the Indian Army 
was being used to storm the center of the religion of “One of the most numerous and successful 
of the Indian Army’s recruited communities…”?169 It wasn’t like Punjab’s Sikhs hadn’t been 
able to gain political benefits from their military service. After the India-Pakistan War 1965, 
Sikhs got their own state drawn along linguistic lines that neatly cut between the Hindu majority, 
Hindi speaking Haryana state and the Sikh majority, Punjabi speaking Punjab state.170 Due to the 
Green Revolution and government price supports, Punjab’s grain output trebled between 1964 
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and 1972 with farmers making a 27 percent return on wheat in 1972.171 Through this period 
Sikhs remaind an important class in the Indian Army. “…in 1962 almost 40 per cent of the 
army’s brigadiers and over 45 per cent of is major-generals were Sikhs. Punjab which was just 
2.45 percent of India’s population in 1981 still accounted for over a tenth of all cadets attending 
the [Indian Military Academy] ten regular courses from 1978-82. A 1991 report estimated that 
Sikhs continued to constitute a fifth of all Indian Army officers.”172 Well into the 1980s India’s 
military security was dangerously dependent for a large part of good functioning relations 
between the Indian government and the Sikhs of Punjab. The collapse of that relationship in 
1984 was a grave challenge to the state’s ability to maintain security. 
 The partition of India in the summer of 1947 divided the Province of Punjab between 
India and West Pakistan. For Punjab’s Sikhs, partition meant that they were no longer a 
somewhat political irrelevant minority. Before Partition, Punjab’s Sikhs were 15 percent of the 
population of Punjab in 1941, a faction in region with many religious groups. After Partition, 
Punjab’s Sikhs were the second largest religious group, 33 percent of the population of Punjab in 
1951, in a state with only two religious groups: Hindus and Sikhs.173 Before, they were a small 
group that did not have a real chance at being the sole dominant political group. Now, they had a 
chance of coming into sole political power in a state. But the Indian government decided that 
there were to be no more religious states created in India because the creation of Pakistan was so 
costly.174 The propaganda organs of the Indian Federal state and the Congress Party’s political 
organism drummed out a steady beat of secularism, non-aligned socialism, and national unity.175 
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‘Secularism’ did not have a positive connotation for Punjab’s Sikh community. ‘Secularism’ for 
the Sikhs meant that the special relationship between the Indian government and the Sikhs that 
the British fostered over the past decades was void. The deal was the Sikhs, as a “martial race”, 
would give the lives of their sons, husbands, fathers, and brothers to protect the interests of the 
state, but in exchange the Sikhs would be given a special status in the colonial hierarchy. The 
colonial leadership would be particularly concerned with their needs. The British would always 
make sure the Sikhs got their family military allowance, their pension payments, and access to 
land on which to retire. The new Congress government seemed to be threatening the Sikhs’ 
special relationship with the Indian government.176 Even as the Sikh community continued to, as 
a “martial race”, join the Army and die in India’s wars, it became increasingly unclear how 
dedicated the civilian political leadership was to the needs of the Sikh community as a special 
group. The rhetoric coming out of the Parliament seemed to suggest that the Congress party 
wanted to end the pattern of “martial races” recruitment all together, totally striping the Sikhs of 
their special status. Furthermore, the national broadcasting about a religiously neutral Indian 
state seem to some in Punjab’s Sikh community as a signal that the national government would 
not act to protect them from Hindu majority Punjabi state government. “Militant Hindu groups, 
confident of their own numerical edge in the new Punjab, referred to the Sikh religion as an 
offshoot of Hinduism and declared that ‘the Sikhs should come back to the Hindu society and be 
absorbed by it.’”177 Punjab’s Sikhs has just witnessed and suffered through the creation of a new 
country to protect the rights of one religious minority in South Asia. Couldn’t they have just a 
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state of their own where they didn’t have to worry about “being absorbed” by a Hindu majority? 
This initial mistrust would dog the relationship until it broke in 1984. 
 Then three things happened. First, Jawahar Lal Nehru died in 1964. Second, India and 
Pakistan fought a war in 1965. Third, the Sikh dominated state of Punjab was created. Jawahar 
Lal Nehru was the Prime Minister of India between 1947 and 1964. His brand of non-aligned 
socialism and national unity was based in a deep fear about what would happen if more divisions 
were created in India. After seeing the costs and damages done by the Partition of India and 
Pakistan along religious lines, it is understandable that Nehru did not want to allow any more 
religious partitions. As such he prevented the formation of any new states in India based on 
religious or ethnic lines. However, in 1964 Nehru died and there was new leadership in the 
Congress Party. The next year, war broke out between India and Pakistan. The Sikh areas of 
Punjab, being along the border between Indian and West Pakistan, were a center of the fighting 
and sustained major damages from the war. Additionally, Sikhs, as a “martial race”, were seen as 
one of the heroes of the 1965 War. These two factors, the change in national leadership and a 
spot light being put on the Sikhs for their actions during the 1965 War, led to the creation of an 
independent Punjab state. The key was to divide the old Punjab state by linguistic groups. The 
Hindi speaking, conincidentally majority Hindu areas, became Haryana. The Punjabi speaking, 
conquedently majority Sikh areas, became Punjab. Punjabi, while spoken by many groups in 
daily usage was closely associated with Sikhism because the sacred text, the Guru Granth Sahib, 
was written in Punjabi using the Gurmukhi script.178 While many groups could speak Punjabi, 
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few non-Sikhs could write and read Punjabi in the Gurmukhi script. Therefore, Sikhs seeking to 
make their own state framed it as a Punjabi linguistic state, not a Sikh religious state. 
Fig. 8: Linguistic Division of Punjab between 1956 and 1966179 
 
 After the creation of the Sikh rump state of Punjab in 1966, relations between the Center 
and the Sikh community settled down. The Green Revolution and government price support 
brought wealth to Sikh farmers. However the mechanization of agriculture did lead to rising rural 
unemployment in the region. Then the outbreak the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and resulting OPEC 
                                                          
179 Baldev Raj Nayar, “Punjab,” In State Politics In India, ed. Myron Weiner (Princetion: Princeton University 
Press, 1968): 434. 
Frederick Harteis 71 
 
oil in bargo created a problem for the Indian government. The cut back in oil production lead 
spike in global oil price. India was a major oil importer with little domestic reserves, so the 
increase in price hit the state hard. As a result the Indian government had to scale back the price 
supports on agricultural production.180 This decision led to economic uncertainty about the future 
of Punjab farming economy. The other problem in relations between the central government and 
the Sikh community was purely political. In the 1977 election, the ruling Congress Party 
dramatically underperformed in Punjab and lost power.181 During the 1977 election the Akali 
Dal, the majority Sikh ruling party in Punjab, broke with the Congress Party and joined the 
opposition Janata Party government.182 When the Congress Party came back into power in 
January 1980, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi used the powers of President’s Rule to dissolve nine 
state legislatures, including Punjab, and call for new elections.183 The Congress Party won a 
narrow victory (63 out of 117 seats).184  
In response a group of supporters of Jagjit Singh Chauhan, a Sikh political leaders who 
had been operating in exile, proclaimed from with the Gold Temple an independent “Khalistan”, 
Sikh national homeland, within the borders of Punjab.185 Chauhan was named the President of 
what was to be a ‘purely Sikh State’.186 Simultaneously, the same proclamation was made in the 
United States, West Germany, Britain, Canada, and France.187 Within Punjab, factions of the 
Akali Dal party began a process of ethnic outbiding and the 20 September 1980 arrest of Jarnail 
Singh Bhindranwale, the militant leader of the Sikh educational organization Damdami Taksal, 
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in connection to the murder of Lala Jagat Narain, the editor of the Hindi language newspaper 
Punjab Kesari.188 Nehru’s nightmare of a second religious partition of India was now a potential 
reality.  
 The arrests of Bhindranwale and the process of ethnic outbiding in the Punjab lead to a 
wave of violence. The market in Jullundur was attack by gunmen on 22 September 1981. On the 
29th an Indian Airlines plane was hijacked in Lahore, Pakistan. The next two months there was a 
shoot at the Secretariat in Chandigarh, the murder of a number of Hindu politicians, two 
policemen were killed and their weapons stolen, and then a bomb went off at headquarters of 
Bhindranwale’s, who had just been released from police custody with all charges dropped.189 By 
the end of the year Bhindranwale was the most powerful political actor in Punjab. Over the next 
two years no faction in Punjab would act without considering his response.190 Over the next two 
year the Akali Dal leaders entered into negotiations with the Indian government to see if there 
was someway to end the conflict.191 The talks fell apart over a failure to reach agreement on 
water rights.192 In August 1982, Bhindranwale moved his headquarters into the Golden Temple 
of Amritsar, the center of the Sikh religion to avoid being arrested again.193 The next 18 months 
saw another wave of violence and the Central government trying the imposition of President’s 
Rule, the deployment of thousands of paramilitary police officers, and the banning of the All 
India Sikh Student Federation in an effort to end the crisis.194 On 23 May 1984, Harchand Singh 
Longowal, the President of the Akali Dal, announced an attempt to stop the sale of grain from 
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Punjab to the Food Corporation of India. Since Punjab at the time provided half the grain for 
central reserve system, used to redistribute grain around the country and keep the price down, the 
blocking of sale of Punjabi grain would have affected food prices in the whole country.195 In 
response, on 2 June, PM Gandhi announced that the Army was now authorited to take the lead in 
Punjab.196 On 5 June, the Indian Army launched Operation Blue Star, its assault on the Golden 
Temple of Amritsar.197 It took two days for the Army to take control of the whole Temple 
complex, killing between 500 and 1200 people, including Bhindranwale, in the complex while 
losing 90 soldiers.198 Over the next year, Army operations to stamp out the rebellion would kill 
up to 5000 people in over 40 raids of Sikh religious sites all around Punjab and would expose 
many more to extreme forms of integration and confession extraction.199  
There was a powerful sense of outrage from many non-rebellious Sikhs that had not be 
mobilized by the previous years’ conflict.200 Indian President, and Sikh, Zail Singh let it be 
known how displeased he was with the storming of the Temple.201 One 7 June there was a 
mutiny by the 9th Battalion of the Sikh Regiment. Six hundred soldiers broke into the regimental 
armoury outside the town of Ganganagar and then drove through the streets shouting “Long live 
Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale” and shooting indiscriminately.202 Units from the Rajputana 
Rifles were sent to arrest the Sikh mutineers.203 A larger mutiny took place in the Sikh 
Regimenatal Centre at Ramgarh in Bihar. Mutineers turn their guns on their commanding 
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officers and then left to try and make it to Amritsar. They were stopped by units from the Punjab 
Regiment and local police at the Shakteshgarh railway station.204 The total number of soldier that 
joined the mutiny was 1,461, of which 1,050 were raw recruits, many of who had been forced to 
desert at gunpoint.205 There were other smaller mutinies around India in Jammu and Poona.206 
These mutinies raised questions about the ongoing loyalty of the Indian Army during times of 
communal unrest. The decision to send soldiers into the Golden Temple tested loyalty of the 
soldiers and lead the most serious crisis of discipline in the ranks that the Army had faces since 
independence.207 The events of 1984 demonstrated the grave danger for the Indian government 
on relying on a handful of “martial races” for the bulk of the Army’s man power.  
One a cool October morning, 31 October 1984, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was 
assassinated by by two Sikh police officers.208 In response there were a series of pogroms against 
Sikhs throughtout the country, with the complicity of the Congress government.209 Independent 
sources believe that between 8,000 and 17,000 people were killed. Government sources 
estimated that 2,800 Sikhs were killed in Delhi.210 The Indian government has yet to prosecute 
those responsible for the mass killing.211 Mass graves have contended to be discovered as 
recently as 2011.212 Later in 1984, in the wake of the assassination of Indira Gandhi and the anti-
Sikh riots, the Congress Party won a landslide victory and Indira Gandhi’s son Rajiv Gandhi 
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secured his position as Prime Minister. On 24 July 1985, Longowal and Gandhi announced an 
agreement that affected ended the conflict between the members of the Sikh community and the 
Indian government.213 
While it may be true that a group’s political leadership can use blood sacrifice as political 
tactic, it doesn’t mean that it is an effective tactic. In the three above examples none of the 
factions deploying blood sacrifice narratives succeeded in achieving their goals. Remembering 
the role of the 54th Massachusetts in the Battle of Fort Wagner did not prevent the collapse of 
African American political power after the end of Reconstruction, the rise of Jim Crow 
segregation, or massive wave of lynching in the 1890s. While Northern Ireland has remained part 
of the United Kingdom, the end The Troubles have rendered the Ulster Volunteer Force 
politically irrelevant. The Ulster Volunteer Force has spent the past twenty years since the Good 
Friday Agreement operating as a minor street gang. It has no political purchase with even the 
Protestant population of Northern Ireland.214 Despite Azam Khan’s invocation of blood sacrifice, 
the Samajwadi Party performed poorly in the 2014 Indian General election. Using the memory of 
a group’s blood sacrifice may not be that effective. The “martial” status of Punjabi Sikhs did not 
prevent the brake down in relations between the Sikh community and the Indian government 
leading a wave of violence both state and non-state in Punjab and targeting Sikhs. Wartime 
service in segregated units marks off each group as different from each other. In a political 
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situations where those group identities are inflamed, like racial identity in late 19th-early 20th 
century America or religious identity in contemporary, marking out your group as not just 
different but special and worthy of praise may not be a viable strategy for a marginalized group. 
Potentially, a more effective strategy for marginalized group to gain political power through 
military service is to serve during war time in integrated units with the dominant group. For 
example American Jews and Catholics became white for a large part by serving with white 
Protestants in the military during the Second World War.215 However, military and political 
leaders maybe unwilling to integrate combat units, limiting the ability of marginalized groups to 
access full citizenship through combat service.   
Conclusion 
The British military tradition of the “Martial Races Theory” of recruitment affected the 
operation of the Indian Army after independence of India. Infantry companies that were 
composed of “martial” groups saw higher levels of combat deployments and were more likely to 
see a combat deployment between 1947 and 1971 than companies that did not have a “martial” 
composition. However, this is not a perfect effect. While overall we see this effect, it is most 
noticeable in the Sino-Indian 1962 War and the India-Pakistan War 1971. Martialness does not 
seem to be an important factor in the unit deployments in the Kashmir War 1947-8 and the India-
Pakistan War 1965. The implication is that, since military service is a sign of citizenship for the 
modern state, the colonial practice of the “Martial Races Theory” continues to effect who is and 
isn’t a citizen in India and how those citizens engage in politics. 
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Appendix A  
“Martial” class groups as defined by the author for the point of this study 
“Martial” class Defining Variable  “Martial” class Defining Variable 
Ahirs Caste, Region216 Kumaonis Ethno-linguistic217 
Brahmans Caste, Region Mahrattas Caste, Region218 
Dogras Ethno-linguistic219 Rajputs Caste, Clan, Region220 
Garhwalis Ethno-linguistic221 Muslim Punjabis Linguistic, Region, Religion 
Gujars Ethno-linguistic222 Muslim Hindustani Linguistic, Region, Religion223 
Jat Hindus Caste, Region, 
Religion224 
Ranghars (Muslim Rajputs) Linguistic, Region, Religion225 
Jats Sikhs Caste, Region, 
Religion226 
Muslim Rajputana and 
Central India 
Region, Religion 
Mazhbi and Ramdasia Sikhs Caste, Religion227 Other Sikhs Religion 
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Appendix C229 
Patterns of Class Recruitment in the Indian Army on the eve of the Second World War 
 Communities 
( * * demarks groups described by MacMunn as a 
“Martial Race”) 












Hindus *Ahirs* 469715 2121 0.45155  
Assamese 106690 0 0  
Bengalis 607017 0 0  
Bhils 24505 0 0  
*Brahmans* 388960 793 0.203877  
Chamars 388215 0 0  
*Dogras* 94696 10570 11.16203  
*Garhwalis* 50820 3816 7.508855  
*Gujars* 65874 1029 1.562073  
Chirts 6510 0 0  
Gurkhas 280000 18000 6.428571  
*Jats Hindus* 153561 9390 6.114834  
Kabirpanthis 1000 0 0  
Kalis 9600 0 0  
*Kumaonis* 39600 2364 5.969697  
Kamhars 51225 0 0  
Lodhis 51466 0 0  
Mahars 120560 0 0  
*Mahrattas* 346800 4771 1.375721  
Meghs 1030 0 0  
Rawats and Minas 30980 0 0  
Oriyas 182953 0 0  
*Rajputs* 335143 5832 1.740153  
Shilpkars 12617 0 0  
Others Hindus 2684947 0 0 
Muslim Pathans 128200 6048 4.717629  
Assamese 80565 0 0 
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Baluchis 11780 57 0.483871  
Bengalis 764720 0 0  
Dekhanis 156478 164 0.104807  
*Muslim Punjabis (including Hazariwals)* 1087450 33935 3.120603  
*Hindustani* 450848 654 0.14506  
Meos 17300 384 2.219653  
Katats 1300 0 0  
*Muslim Rajputana and Central Indian* 53760 1001 1.861979  
*Ranghars* 28160 1857 6.59446  
Others Muslims 161040 0 0 
Sikh *Jats Sikhs* 165625 17156 10.35834  
*Mazbhi and Ramdasia Sikhs* 35000 1303 3.722857  
*Others Sikhs* 127579 4211 3.3007 
Christian Assamese 1642 No Data -  
Others Christian (excluding Madrasis) 51769 No Data - 
Madras 
Classes 
Madras Classes 2843280 4010 0.141034 
Misc. Hos, Oraons, and Mundas 47740 No Data -  
Santhals 60630 No Data -  
Coorgs 6070 No Data -  
Assamese Tribals 72400 No Data - 
Total 
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Appendix D 
Sources used to collect Indian Army unit combat history 
Bhushan, Padma. History of Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry. Srinagar: Jammu and Kashmir 
Light Infantry Regimental Centre, 1992. 
Das, Chand N. Hours Of Glory: Famous Battles Of The Indian Army, 1801-1971. New Delhi: 
Vision Books (Incorporated Orient Paperbacks), 1997. 
-- The Rajputana Rifles: A Brief History. New Delhi: Reliance Publishing House, 1995. 
D’Souza, E. Valour To The Fore: A History of the 4th Battalion, the Maratha Light Infantry 
1800-2000. Mumbai: ARBCCommunications, 2000. 
Gautam, P K. Composition And Regimental System of the Indian Army: Continuity and Change. 
New Delhi: Institute for Defense Studies & Analysis, 2008. 
-- `Infantry, A Glint of the Bayonet. New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 2000. 
Longer, V. Forefront For Ever: The History of the Mahar Regiment. New Delhi: Allied 
Publishers Private Limited, 1981. 
Maxwell, Neville. India’s China War. Dehra Dun: Natraj Publishers, 2015. 
Mazumder, Rajit K. The Indian Army and the Making of Punjab. Delhi, Permanent Black, 2003. 
Palsokar, R D. The Invincible Garuda: Brigade of The Guards 1949-1990. Kamptee: Brigade of 
The Guards Regiment Centre, 1990. 
 -- The Bihar Warriors: A History Record of the Bihar Regiment 1758-1986. Danapur: 
The Bihar Regimental Center, 1986. 
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Prasad, S N and U P Thapliyal, ed. The India-Pakistan War of 1965: A History. New Delhi: 
Natraj Publishers, 2011.  
Prasad, Shanker. The Gallant Dogras: An Illustrated History of the Dogra Regiment. New Delhi: 
Lancer Publishers, 2005. 
Praval, K C. Valour Triumphs: A History of the Kumaon Regiment. Faridabad: Thomson Press 
(India) Limited, 1976. 
 -- India’s Paratroopers (A History of the Parachute Regiment of India). Faridabad: 
Thomson Press (India) Limited, 1975. 
Proudfoot, C L. Valour Enshrined: Volume Two A History of the Maratha Light Infantry 1947-
1979. Belgaum: The Maratha Light Infantry Regimental Centre, 1980. 
Raghavan, V R. By Land And Sea: (The post-Independence History of the Punjab Regiment) 
[1947-1986]. Delhi: Friends Printers & Consultants, 1986. 
Sethna, Am and Valmiki Katju. Traditions of A Regiment: The Story of the Rajputana Rifles. 
New Delhi: Lancers Publishers, 1983. 
Singh, Harbakhsh. War Despatches: Indo-Pak Conflict 1965. New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 
2011. 
Singh, Sarbans. Battle Honours of the Indian Army 1757-1971. New Delhi: Vision Books, 1993. 
Sharma, Gautam. Indian Army (A Reference Manual). New Delhi: Reliance Publishing House, 
2000. 
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 -- Valour and Sacrifice: Famous Regiments of the Indian Army. New Delhi: Allied 
Publishers Limited, 1990. 
Subramaniam, Arjum. India’s Wars: A Military History 1947-1971. Noida: 
HaperCollinsPublishers India, 2016.  
Wilkinson, Steven I. Army And Nation: The Military and Indian Democracy since Independence. 
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